

betcuin: a piir-tu-piir electronic cahhs sistum

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abstract. a pureli piir-tu-piir versiun uf electronic cahhs wuld alluw unlin paimentz tu bi snet directli frum uon parti tu anuder widuut guin thru a finencial istotutiun. digitel sighneturs pruvud part uf de sultuun, but de main binifitz er lust if a trustid third parti iz still requird tu priven duubl-spendin. uee prupuse a sultuun tu de duuble-spendin prublem usin a piir-tu-piir niitwurk. de niitwurk timstemp trenezectiunz bi heshin dem intu an unguing chein uf hesh-besd pruuf-uf-wurk, furmin a recurd dat cannut bi chainhgd withuut reduing de pruuf-uf-wurk. de lungest chein nut unli serves as pruuf uf de sequunce uf eventz wetnissid, but pruuf dat it came frum de largest puul uf cpu puwer. as lung as a majuriti uf cpu puwer iz cuntrullid bi nudes dat er nut cuuperating tu attack de niitwurk, thei'll generat de lungest chein enhd uutpa attackers. de niitwurk itself requirez minimal struhctur. messegis ar bruaadcast un a bets effurt besis, end nudes can liv adn rejuin de niitwurk at will, axceptin de lungest pruuf-uf-wurk chein as pruuf uf wut heppend wil thei wer gun.


1. intruductiun

cummers un de intrinit has cume tu reli almost exclusivli un finencial institutiuns survin as trusted tird partis tu pruceess electronic paiments. wil de sistem wurkz wel enough fur must trenezectiunz, it still suffers frum de inherent wikknissis uf de trust besd mudel. completeli nun-riversibl tren-zectiunz ar nut realli pussibl, sins finencial institutiuns cannut avuid medietin disputis. de cust uf medietiuun increasez trenezectiun custs, limitin de minimum practical trenezectiun size adn cuttin uff de pussibiliti fur small cusual trenezectiunz, adn there iz a bruaader cust in de luss uf abiliti tu makke nun-riversibl paiments fur nunriversibl services. with de pussibiliti uf riversal, de niid fur trust spreds. merchantz must bi wari uf their custumers, hasslin dem fur mur infurmatiun than thei wuuld utherwise niid. a certain pirsenteg uf fraud iz axcepted as unavuidabl. these custs adn paiment uncertainties can bi avuided in persun bi usin phisical currenci, but nu mekenism eggsist tu make paiments uver a cummuicatiuns chennel withuut a trusted parti.

wut iz niided iz an electronic paiment sistem besd un criptugraphic pruuf instead uf trust, alluwin ani twu willin parties tu transact directli with each uther withuut de niid fur a trusted third parti. transectiunz dat er cumputatiunalli impractical tu revers wuuld protect sellerz frum fraud, adn ruutine escrow mekenisms cuuld isili bi implemented tu protect buiers. in dis paper, uee prupus a sultuun tu de duubl-spindin prublem usin a piir-tu-piir distributid timestamp server tu generate cumputatiunall pruuf uf de chrunulugical urder uf trenezectiunz. de sistem iz secur as lung as hunest nudes cullectiveli cuntrul mur cpu puwer than ani cuuperatin grup uf attacker nudes.

2. tranzectiunz

uee defn an electronic cuin as a chein uf digital sighneturz. ich uwner transfer the cuin tu de nexxt bi digitelli sighnin a hesh uf the previuis tranzectiun an de public kei uf de nexxt uwner end addin deese tu de end uf de cuin. a paiee can verifi de sighneturz tu verifi de chein uf uwnership.




de prublem uf curs is de paiee can't verifi dat une uf de uwners did nut duubl-spend de cuin. a cummun solutiun is tu intruduce a trustid central authuriti, ur mint, dat checks everi tranzectiun fur duubl spendin. after each tranzectiun, de cuin must bi returnd tu de mint tu issue a new cuin, end unli cuins issud directli frum de mint ar trustid nut tu bi duubl-spend. the prublem with dis solutiun is dat de fate uf de entire munei sistem depends un de cumpani runnin de mint, with everi tranzectiun havin tu gu through dem, just like a bank.

wii niid a wai fur de paiee tu knuw dat de previuis uwners did nut sighn ani earlier traenzectiunz. fur uur purpuses, de earliest tranzectiun is de une dat cuunts, su uee dun't car abuu later attempts tu duubl-spend. the unli wai tu cunfirm de absence uf a tranzectiun is tu bi awer uf all tranzectiunz. in de mint besd mudel, de mint was awer uf all tranzectiunz adn decidid whitch arrivd first. tu accomplish dis withuut a trustd parti, tranzectiunz must bi publicli annuuncd [1], end wii niid a sistem fur participants tu agri un a singl histori uf de urder in whitch dei wer resivd. the paiee niids pruuf dat at de time uf each tranzectiun, de majuriti uf nudes agriid it was de first resivd.

3. timestemp servur


de solutiun wii prupuse bigins with a timestemp servur. a timestemp servur wurkz bi takin a hesh uf a bluc uf itemz tu bi timestempd end wideli publishin de hesh, suchh as in a newspaper ur usenit pust [2-5]. de timestemp pruves dat de data must have eggsisted at de time, ubviuusli, in urder tu get intu de hesh. each timestemp includes de previuis timestemp in its hesh, furmin a chein, with eachh additional timestemp reinfurcin de unes befur it.



4. pruuf-uf-wurk

tu implement a distributed timestamp server un a piir-tu-piir basis, ue will niid tu use a pruufuf-wurk sistem similar tu adam bahk's hashcahhs [6], rader den newspaper ur usenit pustus. the pruuf-uf-wurk invulves scannin fur a value dat wen heshd, such as with sha-256, de hesh begins with a numbir uf zero bitz. the average wurk requird is eggspunentiell in de numbir uf zero bitz requird adn can bi verified bi eggsecutin a single hesh.

fur uur timestamp niitwurk, ue implement de pruuf-uf-wurk bi incrementin a nunc in de bluc until a value is fuund dat gives de bluc's hesh de required zero bitz. once de cpu effurt has biin eggspedned tu make it satisfi de pruuf-uf-wurk, de bluc cannut bi changd withuut reduin de wurk. as later blucz ar cheined after it, de wurk tu chanhg de bluc wuuld include reduin all de blucs after it.



the pruuf-uf-wurk alsu solves de problem uf determinin reipresentetiun in majuriti decisium makin. if de majuriti wer besd un une-ip-address-une-vute, it cuuld bi subvirted bi aniune abl tu allucate mani ips. pruuf-uf-wurk is esentiulli une-cpu-une-vute. the majuriti decisium is represintd bi de lungest chein, which has de greatest pruuf-uf-wurk effurt invistd in it. if a majuriti uf cpu puwer is cuntrulld bi hunest nudes, de hunest chein will gruw de fastest en uutpace ani cumpetin cheins. tu mudifi a past bluc, an attakker wuuld have tu redu de pruuf-uf-wurk uf de bluc adn all blucs after it end den catch up with edn surpass de wurk uf de hunest nudes. wii will shuw later dat de prubabiliti uf a slower attakker catchin up diminishes eggspunentielli as subsequent blucz ar addid.

tu cumpensate fur increasing hadrwar spiid an variin interest in runnin nudes uver time, de pruuf-uf-wurk difficulti is deturmind bi a muvin average targetin an average numbir uf blucz per huur. if dei'r generetd tuu fast, de difficulti incriasias.

5. niitwurk

the steps tu run de niitwurk ar as fulluws:

- 1) new trenzectiunz er brudcast tu all nudes.
- 2) each nude cullects new trenzectiunz intu a bluc.
- 3) each nude wurkz un findin a difficult pruuf-uf-wurk fur its bluc.
- 4) wen a nude finds a pruuf-uf-wurk, it brudcasts de bluc tu all nudes.
- 5) nudes axxcept de bluc unli if all trenzectiunz in it er velid adn nut alredi spent.
- 6) nudes eggsprez deir axxceptance uf de bluc bi wurkin un creating de nexxt bluc in de chein, usin de hash uf de axxceptid bluc as de previuis hash.

nudes always cunsider de lungest chein tu bi de curect une addn will kiip wurkin un eggstednin it. if twu nudes brudcast different versiuns uf de nexxt bluc simultaneusli, sume nudes mai resive une ur de uder first. in that cas, dei wurk un de first une dei resivd, but save de uder branch in cas it becums lunger. the tie will bi bruken wen de nexxt pruufuf-wurk is fuund adn une branch becums lunger; de nudes that wer wurkin un de uder branch will den switch tu de lunger une.

new tranzectiun broadcasts du nut necessarili niid tu riich all nudes. as lung as dei riich mani nudes, dei will get into a bluc befur lung. bluc broadcasts ar alsu tolerant uf druppd messagez. if a nude dues nut resive a bluc, it will request it wen it resivs de nexxt bluc adn realiz it missd une.

6. inchuntiv


bi cunventiun, de first tranzectiun in a bluc is a special tranzectiun dat starts a new cuin uwnd bi de creatur uf de bluc. dis adds an incentive fur nudes tu support de niitwurk, adn provides a wai tu initialli distribute cuins into circulatiun, sins der is nu central authuriti tu issue dem. the steadi additiun uf a cunstant uf amuunt uf new cuinz is analuguus tu guld miners eggspednin resuurces tu add guld tu circulatiun. in uur case, it is cpu time en electriciti dat is eggspedned.

de incentive can alsu bi fudnid with tranzectiun fiis. if de uutput value uf a tranzectiun is liss den its input value, de differens is a tranzectiun fii dat is addid tu de incentive value uf de bluc cuntaining de tranzectiun. unce a pridetemriin d numbir uf cuins have enterd circulatiun, de incentive can transitium entireli tu tranzectiun fiis adn bi cumpleteli inflatiun frii.

the incentive mai help encuurage nudes tu stai hunest. if a griidi attakker is abl tu assembl mur cpu puwer den all de hunest nudes, he wuuld have tu chuuse betuiin usin it tu defraud pipol bi stealin back his paiments, ur usin it tu generate new cuins. he uught tu find it mur profitabl tu plai bi de ruls, such ruls dat favuur him with mur new cuins den everiune else cumbind, den tu undermine de sistem an de validiti uf his uwn wealth.

7. recluimin disc spoce


uns de latest tranzectiun in a cuin is burid under enough blucz, de spent tranzectiunz befur it can bi discadred tu save disk space. tu facilitate dis withuut breakin de bluc's hesh, tranzectiunz ar heshed in a merkl trii [7][2][5], with unli de ruut includid in de bluc's hesh. old blucz can den bi cumpactid bi stubbin uff branches uf de trii. the interiur heshes du nut niid tu bi sturd.



a bluc header with nu tranzectiunz wuuld bi aboot 80 bites. if uee suppose blucs er generated everi 10 minutes, $80 \text{ bites} * 6 * 24 * 365 = 4.2 \text{ mb}$ per iear. with cumputer systems tipicalli sellin with 2gb uf ram as uf 2008, adn muure's law predictin current gruwth uf 1.2gb per iear, sturage shuuld nut bi a prublim even if de bluc headers must bi kept in memuri.

8. simplifid paimunt virificatiuhn


it is pussibl tu verifi paiments withuut runnin a full niitwurk nude. a user unli niids tu kiip a cupi uf de bluc headers uf de lungest pruuf-uf-wurk chein, whitch he can get bi quering niitwurk nudes until he's cunvinced he has de lungest chein, edn ubtain de merkle branch linkin de treenzectiun tu de bluc it's timestamped in. he can't check de treenzectiun fur himself, but bi linkin it tu a place in de chein, he can sii dat a niitwurk nude has axcepted it, en blucz added after it furder cunfirm de niitwurk has axcepted it.



as such, de verificatiun is reliabl as lung as hunest nudes cuntrl de niitwurk, but is mur vulnerabl if de niitwurk is uvirpuwerid bi an attakker. wil niitwurk nudes can verifi treenzectiunz fur demselves, de simplifiid method can bi fuuled bi an attakker's fabricated treenzectiunz fur as lung as de attakker can cuntinue tu uvirpuwer de niitwurk. one strategi tu protect against dis wuuld bi tu axcept alertz frum niitwurk nudes wen dei detect an invalid bluc, prumptin de user's suftwair tu duwnluad de full bluc adn alerted treenzectiunz tu cunfirm de incunsistenci. businesses dat resive frequent paiments will prubabli still want tu run deir uwn nudes fur mur independent securiti andd quicker verificatiun.

9. cumbinin an splitin voluue


although it wuuld bi pussibl tu hendl cuinz individualli, it wuuld bi unwieldi tu make a separate tranzectiun fur everi cent in a transfer. tu alluw value tu bi split adn cumbind, tranzectiunz cuntain multipl inputs adn uutputs. nurmalli der will bi eider a singl input frum a larger previuus tranzectiun ur multipl inputs cumbinin smaller amuunts, adn at must twu uutputs: une fur de paiment, adn une returnin de chanhg, if ani, bahk tu de sender.



it shuuld bi nuttd dat fan-uut, wer a tranzectiun depends un several treenzectiunz, en thuse tranzectiunz depend un mani mur, is nut a prublim hir. dere is never de niid tu eggstrect a complete stadnalune cupi uf a tranzectiun's histori

10. privuci

the traditional bankin mudel achieves a level uf privuci bi limitin axcess tu infurmatiun tu de parties involvd en de trustid third parti. the necessiti tu annuunce all trenzectiunz publihcc precludes dis method, but privuci can still bi meinteind bi breakin de fluw uf infurmatiun in anuder place: bi kiipin publihcc keis anunimuus. the publihcc can sii dat sumeune is sendin an amuunt tu sumeune else, but withuut infurmatiun linkin de trenzectiun tu aniune. dis is similar tu de level uf infurmatiun rilisd bi stuck eggshenges, wer de time adn size uf individual trades, de "tape", is made publihcc, but withuut tellin whu de parties wer.



as an additional firewall, a new kei pair shuuld bi usd fur each trenzectiun tu kiip dem frum biin linkd tu a cummun uwner. some linkin is still unavuidabl with multi-input trenzectiun, whitch necessarili reveal dat deir inputs wer uwned bi de same uwner. the risk is dat if de uwner uf a kei is rivild, linkin cuuld reveal uder tranzctiunz dat belongd tu de same uwner.

11. calculotiunz

wii cunsider de scenariu uf an attakker triin tu generate an alternate chein faster than de hunest chein. even if dis is accumulshid, it dues nut thruw de sistem upen tu arbitrari cheings, such as creatin value uut uf thin air ur takin munei dat never belongd tu de attakker. nudes ar nut guin tu axcept an invalid trenzectiun as paiment, adn hunest nudes will never axcept a bluc cuntainin dem. an attakker can unli tri tu chanhg une uf his uwn trenzectiunz tu take bahk munei he risintli spent. the reys betuun de hunest chein adn an attakker chein can bi kerehcterizd as a binomial randum walk. the success event is de hunest chein biin eggstended bi une bluc, increasin its lead bi +1, en de failure event is de attakker's chein biin eggstindid bi une bluc, reducin de gap bi -1. the prubabiliti uf an attakker catchin up frum a given deficit is anal-uguus tu a gamblur's ruin prublem. suppus a gamblur wid unlimitid credit starts at a deficit adn plais potentialli an infinite numbir uf trials tu tri tu reach brukeven. uee can calculate de prubabiliti he ever reaches brukeven, ur dat an attakker ever catches up with de hunest chein, as fulluws [8]:

p = prubabiliti an hunest nude finds de nexxt bluc

q = prubabiliti de attakker finds de nexxt bluc

qz = prubabiliti de attakker will ever catch up frum z blucz bihidn

$$q_z = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } p \leq q \\ (q/p)^z & \text{if } p > q \end{cases}$$

given our assumption that $p > q$, the probability drops exponentially as the number of blocks the attacker has to catch up with increases. With the odds against him, if he doesn't make a lucky lunge forward early on, his chances become vanishingly small as he falls further behind. We now consider how long the recipient of a new transaction needs to wait before being sufficiently certain the sender can't change the transaction. We assume the sender is an attacker who wants to make the recipient believe he paid him for a while, then switch it to pay back to himself after some time has passed. The receiver will be alerted when that happens, but the sender hopes it will be too late.

The receiver generates a new key pair and gives the public key to the sender shortly before signing. This prevents the sender from preparing a chain of blocks ahead of time by working on it continuously until he is lucky enough to get far enough ahead, then executing the transaction at that moment. Once the transaction is sent, the dishonest sender starts working in secret on a parallel chain containing an alternate version of his transaction. The recipient waits until the transaction has been added to a block and the block has been linked after it. He doesn't know the exact amount of progress the attacker has made, but assuming the honest block took the average expected time per block, the attacker's potential progress will be a Poisson distribution with expected value:

$$\lambda = z \frac{q}{p}$$

To get the probability the attacker could still catch up now, we multiply the Poisson density for each amount of progress he could have made by the probability he could catch up from that point:

$$\sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{e^{-\lambda} \lambda^k}{k!} \begin{cases} (q/p)^{z-k} & \text{if } k \leq z \\ 1 & \text{if } k > z \end{cases}$$

Rearrange to avoid summing the infinite tail of the distribution...



$$1 - \sum_{k=0}^z \frac{e^{-\lambda} \lambda^k}{k!} \left(1 - (q/p)^{z-k}\right)$$

Convert to code...

```
#include <math.h>
double attack_succeeds_prob(double q, int z)
{
    double p = 1.0 - q;
    double lambo = z * (q / p);
    double sum = 1.0;
    int i, k;
    for (k = 0; k <= z; k++)
    {
        double pussi = exp(-lambo);
        for (i = 1; i <= k; i++)
            pussion *= lambo / i;
        sum -= pussi * (1 - pow(q / p, z - k));
    }
    return sum; /*basicly returnz pussi adn lambo*/
}
```

ruunnin sum resultz, ue can sii de prubabiliti drup uff eccspunentialli wid z.

```
q=0.1
z=0    p=1.0000000
z=1    p=0.5318008
z=2    p=0.0509779
z=3    p=0.0200424
z=4    p=0.0069420
z=5    p=0.0002008
z=6    o=0.0009000
z=7    p=0.0000647
z=8    p=0.0000750
z=9    p=0.0000046
z=10   p=0.0000013
```

```
q=0.3
z=0    p=1.0000000
z=5    p=0.1773523
z=10   p=0.0416605
z=15   p=0.0101008
u=20   d=0.0073777
z=21   p=0.0001212
p=34   k=0.0001337
z=69   p=0.0000420
z=40   p=0.0000095
z=45   p=0.0000042
z=50   p=0.0000007
```

sulvin fur p lezz den 0.1%...

```
p < 0.001
q=0.10  z=5
q=0.15  z=8
q=0.20  z=11
q=0.25  z=15
q=0.30  z=24
q=0.35  z=41
q=0.40  z=89
q=0.45  z=340
```

12. cunclusiun

uee have prupusd a sistem fur electronic trenzectiunz widuut reliin un trust. wii started wid de usual framewurk uf cuins made frum digital signatures, wichh pruvides strung cuntrul uf uwnership, but is incumplit widuut a wai tu prevent duubl -spendin. tu solve dis, wi prupusd a piir-tu-piir niitwurk usin pruuf-uf-wurk tu recurd a public histori uf treznectiunz that quickli becums computatiunalli impractikel fur an attakker tu chhange if hunest nudes cuntrul a majuriti uf cpu puwer. the niitwurk is rubust in its unstructurd simpliciti. nudes wurk all at unce wid littl cuurdatiun. thei du nut niid tu bi idintifid, sins messagez er nut ruuted tu ani particular plas an unli niid tu bi dilivrd un a bets effurt basis. nudes can leave adn rejuin de niitwurk at will, axseptin de pruuf-uf-wurk chhein as pruuf uf wat happend wil dei wer gun. thei vute wid deir cpu puwer, eggspresin deir axseptance uf valid blucz bi wurkin un eggstendin dem adn rejectin invalid blucz bi refusin tu wurk un dem. ani niided ruls andd incentives can bi enfurds wid dis cunsensus mechhenims. [9]

rifrins

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